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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Guardianship of
the persons and estates of
ERNEST HEMINGWAY O'HARE,
:BJLIZABETH TALBOT, NICOLLE
TALBOT, MICHELLE TALBOT,.
and EMELINE IRENE TALBOT,
minors.

BRIEF OF
APPELANT
Civil No. ___________ _

STA':rEl\fENT OF POINTS REL1ED UPON BY
PETITIONER AND APPELLANT
1. That the Court erred in making and entering that
portion of its decree and order dated the 8th day of October, 1958, which reads as follows:

''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court
declines to make an-y order concerning the guardianship of the persons of the said Talbot minorSherein for the reason and upon the grounds that
each child has a surviving parent who has custody
of said child and that jurisdiction in this matter
lies exdusively in the Juvenile Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Utah."' (R. 6}.
2. That th~ Court erred in refusing and failing to
hear and take testimony and evidence pertaining to the
best interests of said minor·s with relation to and in re-
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gard to the appointment of a-guardian of the persons of
said ~inors,-- and in.- failing and refusing to take jurisdiction and make an appropriate d~cre~ and ord~r respecting such guardianship of the persons of said minors.
(R. 16, 17 & 18).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This iH an act:ion, by petition of Charles Sweeny,
the matet:naLgrandfather for the appointment of himself
as guardian of the persons and estates of the above
minors.
The appeal presented herewith, involves purely a
legal proposition .. concerning_ the jurisdiction of the district court to appoint guardians of the persons of chil·
dren under 18 years of age. There are no disputed
factual situations concerned herein, and a transcript of
the evidence would- in no way aid the Court in its decision
on this appeal. Counsel for Verden L. Talb~t (herein~
after referred to as "Talbot") who filed the objections
and cross-petition concurs in this ·statenlent. Themother of the minors was divorced from Talbot on May
26, 1958, which would have, except tor her prior death,
become final on August 26, 1958.
Under the terms of the decree- (Emeline Talbot, vs.
Verden L. Talbot, Civil No. 8573, Cache County District
Court.) the plaintiff, . Inother, was awarded the EXCLUSIVE care, .custody and control of the four Talbot
children. The two 0 'Hare children, one of which was
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killed with his mother, were by the first husband of Mrs.
rralbot.
Talbot was restrained from in any way molesting
his wife, and was enjoined and restricted from entering
on the home premises occupied by the family until further order of the Court.
:.Mrs. Talbot left for Salt Lake City on August 13,
1958 to complete final arrangements for a voyage of
herself and all of her children to France, leaving the four
r_ralbot children with an aunt at Lewiston. On the evening of the next day, returning to Cache Valley, she and
her older son Charles Sweeny O'Hare were killed in an
automobile accident near Wellsville, and the other son,
Ernest Hemingway 0 'Hare was seriously and probably
permanently injured. Thereupon, Talbot took custody
of the four Talbot minors, and the court below, in its
order, found that he had such custody, as will more fully
appear under ARGUMENT.
The estates of all of said minors, excepting the tort
claim against the Utah By-Products Company, resulting
from the accident, has been furnished solely by the
petitioner, Charles Sweeny, the income from which has
been largely if not solely the entire means of support of
the Talbot family for some years. He commenced these
proceedings for the guardianship for the protection of
their estates, and as incidental thereto, also requested
guardianship of the persons of the minors alleging that
the father ,also the step father of the O'Hare children)
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was not a fit and proper :person to be appointed guardian
of their persons or estates.
rrhe oldest living child ·(Ernest) )is 11 years~ and the
youngest one is three.
At the. hearing on the petition, objections and crosspetition, on September 29, 1958, and wholly upon the
cross-examination alone of Talbot (called as a hostile
witness by petitioner) the court announced that he was
ready to appoint a guardian of the estates, but not the
persons, of the mino~s. It was then stipulated by all
parties that Cache Y alley Branch, \Yalker Bank & Trust
Company be appointed guardian of the estates of said
nunors. The court then declined to make any ruling,
either upon the testimony before it, or any testimony and
evidence which may be produced, upon the matter of the
guardianship of the persons of the minors.
A ttonwys for petitioner then made a detailed offer

of proof in substance as follo\\·s: (R. beginning at 13).
(To prove) that the reputation Yerden L. Talbot, cross petitioner, hereinafter referred to as
Talbot. "·as bad as to being law abiding, and as to
fitness to act as guardian, and as to sobriety and
In oral character: that he was not a fit person to
act as guardian. and that such was his reputation
in his conununit~-: that he Inistreated tlie children
he f'ought to act as guardian -for: that he unnece~sarily re1nained away from home for long
periods; that ofticers had to be called to the home
to protect the fmnilr from him; that he, in his
wife ·s divorce was not permitted the usual rights
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of visitation with his children; that he engaged in
bootlegging; that he associated with women of illrepute; all of which more fully appears in the
record.
The court then refused the offer and made the order
appealed fron1.

ARGUMENT
The two

state~nent

of points relied on by appellant

are so closely allied that no good purpose could be
accomplished by separate treatment, and therefore will
be considered as consolidated under the single question
presented by this appeal, i.e. does the juvenile court, in
a case such as this, have the exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the person of a minor~ Or to put
the matter conversely - did the district court, in this
case, have jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the
persons of the minors, or either of them"?
It is apparent that the court below refused to take
jurisdiction of the matter of the guardianship of the
persons of such minors due to the provisions of 55-10-5,
DCA 1953:

''The juvenile court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect,
dependency and delinquency of children who are
under eighteen years of age ... and the custody,
detention, guardianship of the person, trial and
care of such neglected, dependent and delinquent
children, and the employment of children as provided by law."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We are only concerned with the catagory of dependency which is defined in 55-10-6 UCA 1953, (so far
as applicable here) as" a child whose custody is in question or dispute''.
The question presented by this appeal, is the same
as presented by the case before this court in In Re State
in Interest of Johnson, (Ltah) 175 P. 2d 486, which
held:
"\Yhen the custody is conceded to be in the parent,
but action is instituted to have the custody
changed to another as a protection to the- child,
custody is not in question or dispute as contemplated by the statute."
The court below made a specific finding in its order
that the n1inors were then in the custody of a natural
parent, so that this n1atter falls squarely within the
ruling of the Johnson case (supra). ~lpplying the rule
announced hy this court in Re State (rtah) 110 P. 2d
11:2. it at once becomes perfectly apparent that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction whatsoeYer. So that if the
portion of the order appealed fron1 be adopted, we are
at once faced "~ith the dile1na that neither court has
juri~didion and the matter of a guardianship of the
pPr~ollf' of the n1inors could neYer bemne settled so long
Hf' t})('~· WPI'<' not :wtnall~· dependent. neglected or delinquent.
:l:l-10-rl UCA 1953 contains a saving clause which
111<'<'1~ our

f'ituation:
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sub ( 4) ''Nothing herein contained shall deprive
other courts of the right to determine the custody
of children upon writs of habeas corpus, or when
such custody is incidental to the determination of
causes in such courts. ''
The order of the court below forces another inconsistency which only to mention points up the position
of appellant. We submit that it is entirely clear that our
juvenile courts have absolutely no jurisdiction to appoint
guardians of minors estates. Thus in every guardianship matter involving both types the jurisdiction of two
distinct courts of record must always be invoked. Such
is not the law of this State.
Furthermore, if the lower court's rule is adopted,
we may appropriately ask: What becomes of 75-13-12,
UCA 1953 ~ This statute in part states:
''The district court for each county, when it appears necessary or convenient may appoint guardians for the persons and estates, or either of them,
of minors who have no guardian legally appointed
by will or deed,'' etc.
This, or similar statutes have been in force, and
constantly practiced ever since at least 1888 wherein
(Compiled laws of Utah, 1888, Vol.1, page 103) it reads:
''Probate courts, in their respective counties shall
have jurisdiction in the settlements of the estates
of descendents, and in matters of guardianship
and other like matters."
That was legislation by The Congress of the United
States, and it is interesting to note that in the Edmunds -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Tucker Law (same volume, page 117) the Congress disapproved and annulled all of laws of the Utah Legislative
Assembly confering jurisdiction on probate courts,
44

other than in respect of estates of deceased per.:;ons,

and in respect of the guardianship of the persons and
property of infants,'' etc.
When the utah Constitution was adopted on M_ay
8, 1H!l;> the Convention adopted what it called a "Schedule'' for the conversion from Territorial existence to
Statehood (Proceedings- Constitutional Convention,
1895, Y ol. 2, page 1881) and among other matters prodded that:
""\\nen the State is admitted into the Union, and
the District Courts in the respective districts are
organized, the books, records, papers and proceedings of the probate court in each county, and
all causes and matters of administration pending
therein, upon the expiration of the term of office
of the Probate Judge, on the second Monday in
January, 1896. shall pass into the jurisdiction and
possession of the District Court". etc.
In the "Laws of the Territory of Utah". (Laws of
Utah. lSS-1- p. -1-;)l ), the :2Gth Session of the Legislative
Af;~Pmh]y adopted language identical to that which appear~ in 75-13-12, rcA 1953. except that the term
''probate court'' wa~ used, and '·Territor~~·· was used
instead of ''~tate''.
In view of the historical background, and long and
continued usage, it is inconceivable that 75-13-12, UCA
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1953 was repealed by irnplication when 55-10-5-, UCA
1953 became law.

Juvenile courts in Utah seem to be the creatures /of
the Sixth Legislature of Utah, 1905 (L. Utah, 1905 p.
182). This created juvenile courts in cities of the first
and second class, and provided that such courts shall
have jurisdiction "in all cases relating to children, including juvenile delinquents''.
From this modest beginning, the Compiled Laws o~
Utah, 1917, p. 439 represented a significant development of the juvenile court movement in Utah, wherein
it provided as to jurisdiction:
"The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction in all
cases relating to the custody, detention, guardianship of the person, probation, neglect, dependency,
delinquency, examination, trial, and care of children who are under eighteen years of age'', etc.
· Then came the sweeping Act of the Session Laws
of Utah, for 1931, p. 51 and repealed specified chapters
of previous enactments, BUT DID NOT REPEAL ANY
PREVIOUS ACT RELATING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS. It was in this 1931 Act that
we first find the words:
''The juvenile court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction (ours) in all cases relating to the
neglect, dependency and delinquency of children
who are under eighteen years of age", etc.
And it was in that Act wherein the saving clause
preserved in other courts jurisdiction when custody is
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irlCideD;tal to the determinati.on of ~auses in sueh courts.
And likewise it defined a dependent child to include one
"whose custody is in question or ·dispute".
This court has held (In re: Cowan's Estate, .99 P.
2d 605, and in other cases) that long usage and practice
will not be passed over lightly by the Supreme Court in
interpreting a statute.

And now certainly, we submit

that the general statute providing for the appointment
of Guardians of the persons of minors by the district
courts, was not repealed by the Juvenile Court Act.
It is a certainty that the question here presented is
either (1) a civil matter, or (2) a probate matter. Assume it to be civil- then Art. VIII, Sec. 7 of our Constitution provides:
''The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by
law;" (Note : There is no exceptions).
· Assume it to be a probate n1atter- is jurisdiction
in this case prohibited by law~ In addition to the provisions of 75-13-12 (supra) we are met with 75-1-6 UCA
1953:
''The district and Supreme Courts and the judges
thereof sitting in probate and guardianship matters (ours) shall exercise all such powers. (ours),
consistent with the provisions of this title", etc.
The juvenile court statute is not contained in that
title. We think it appropriate to quote the following

I

1
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fron1 this Court. In Re Rice's Estate, 182 P. 2d 111:
''The qu-estion of the jurisdiction and powers of
District Courts in this state have been before this
court on numerous occasions and particularly
with respect to the powers, rights and remedies
of a court when it js dealing with an action
brought under the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, or
the Probate Code (ours). There is little need to
again discuss the extent of the jurisdiction
granted to District Courts by the Constitution of
the State of Utah and the statutes consistent
therewith. 'rhat District Courts have original
jurisdiction in matters, civil, criminal, probate,
a:nd gu,ardianship, (ours) is admitted~'.
It is no answer to the question at hand to state that
petitioner has his remedy under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. He does not have such remedy
because such courts have no jurisdiction over probate
matters; and guardianships where uncontested are probate matters ,and when contested are tried as civil matters under our Code of Civil Procedure. The court below
had not the right or power to attempt to force appellant
into two separate proceedings.

This Court in the Rice case (supra) after stating
standards to be met in determining the nature of an
action stated:
''If these standards are met, then the court can
determine which is the appropriate arm but it
cannot refuse the use of either. Had ·the court
in this action sustained the demurrer on the
grounds it did not have jurisdiction, it would have
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denied petitioner the use of either arm, although
he was entitled to the use of one".
That the juvenile courts do ~ot have exclusive jurisdiction in matters concerning the custody of juveniles
becomes clear when we refer to the matter of custody of
children in divorce casesA We believe that no member of
the Bar would contend that a divorce court must decide
the matter of divorce, and then hold that it c0uld not
deterrnine the matter of the custody of the children.
We feel that the court below has misc<>neeived the
nature of the juvenile court Act. ·fhat Act becomes applicable when facts are alleged or exist giving the State
the right to step in and take control of the child. That
is the explicit holding of the Johnson case (supra) :
''In other words there is no need for the State to
take control of such a child, as by statute the parent is given that preferential right until adjudicated otherwise. On the other hand if the child
is not in custody of a natural parent and the contestants for its custody are not obligated by law
to assunw responsibility for its care, it is a child
whose custody is in question or dispute, requiring the State to consider the clz ild as a dependent
child as defined in the third definition quoted
above; and ASSUlliE CO}..:TROL OrER IT ...
It seems clear that the allegations of the petition in this case are insufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the jnl'enile court." (ours).
~rh~·

specific finding of the court below appealed
from, to thE> effect that the custody of the children are
in a natural parent. n1akes it in1possible, under the
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ruling of the Johnson case (supra) to invoke the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Thus, appellant is finds
himself in the position that the district court will not
take jurisdiction, and the juvenile court cannot do so
under the facts alleged in this case. Hence, this appeal.
Respectfully Submitted
Preston and Harris
and B. H. Harris
Attorneys for Appellant
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